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1 Introduction 
Even though the beginnings of international environmental law as a discipline can be traced 
back to the year 1972
1
, it was only in the 1980s that anthropogenic climate change became 
a distinct legal and policy concern. A number of physical factors, notably the record-high 
temperatures
2
 and the occurrence of extreme weather events like the drought in the Mid-
west of the United States during the summer of 1988, raised the issue’s public profile3. In 
addition to this, important progress in the field of climate science, in particular the im-
proved modelling and predictive work made possible by steadily more powerful computers, 
had increased the scientific community’s certainty over the causes and consequences of the 
changing climate
4
. 
 
These factors compelled the UN to take action. It responded by creating the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988
5
 and the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992
6
. Today, more than twenty years later, the 
regime is well established, with the aforementioned institutions respectively standing as the 
scientific and normative cornerstones of the international climate change regime. The in-
ternational community however still faces many challenges in regards to climate change. In 
the field of international law, one of those challenges lies in the fact that the repercussions 
of the changing climate are wide-reaching and are not all addressed in international envi-
ronmental instruments. Norms and practices in other spheres of law, from human rights to 
the law of the sea, must take into account the changes in circumstance resulting from cli-
mate change.  
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This thesis illustrates the complexity of the emerging legal issues stemming from climate 
change by analyzing the legal implications of adaptation to climate-induced sea level rise in 
the case of Pacific island States. This analysis is divided in three parts. First, a framing of 
the research underlines the pertinence of focusing on the crosscutting notion of adaptation 
to sea level rise in Pacific island States. Second, a review of the legal issues raised in this 
context draws attention to a number of normative gaps in different areas of international 
law. Third, an analysis of the solutions put forward in the literature highlights different 
approaches for addressing these gaps and suggests some measures that could prove useful 
in the current situation. 
 
2 Framing of the research 
Since the inception of the international climate change regime, continuous improvement in 
understanding the phenomenon has resulted in an evolution of the regime’s breadth. Some 
aspects, such as sea level rise, have always been considered specifically important but still 
represent significant policy and scientific challenges as increased understanding revealed 
complexities not initially taken into account. Others, like adaptation and the special situa-
tion of the Pacific island States, are today recognized as worthy of additional attention even 
though some of their distinct characteristics were initially overlooked. This chapter of the 
thesis further defines and retraces the evolution of these aspects in the climate change re-
gime, underlining the importance of focusing on the crosscutting concept that is adaptation 
to sea level rise in Pacific island States.  
 
2.1 Sea Level Rise 
The idea that anthropogenic climate change could lead to a rise of the world’s oceans was 
one of the first postulated consequences of the phenomenon. Already in 1963, a group of 
scientists presenting as part of a conference at the Conservation Foundation in New York 
argued that even though a “general lack of quantitative knowledge of the biogeochemistry 
of the Earth” subsisted, “it [seemed] quite certain that a continuing rise in the amount of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide [was] likely to be accompanied by a significant warming of the 
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surface of the earth which […] would raise sea level”7. The reasoning behind this claim 
was twofold. First, a warmer climate would warm the Earth’s seas and oceans, which 
would occupy more space through thermal expansion. Second, the warmer climate would 
lead to increased summer melting of the polar ice caps, accompanied by a reduced regener-
ation of those icecaps because of reduced snowfall and shorter winters: the water from 
those icecaps would cause the oceans to rise
8
. The amount and quality of evidence support-
ing this theory increased as climate science improved. Significant progress was notably 
made over the last decade: the IPCC’s level of certitude over its AR5 projections for sea 
level rise, for example, has increased in comparison to its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4). The Panel credits “the improved physical understanding of the components of sea 
level [and] the improved agreement of process-based models with observations” 9 for this 
increased confidence. 
 
Even if the IPCC can now state with “very high confidence” that climate induced sea level 
rise is a reality and that “coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience 
[its] adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding and coastal erosion”10, many 
uncertainties remain. Recent sea level rise has been both more rapid and more substantial 
than estimated: for example, since the advent of satellite measuring in the early 1990s, the 
rise has proven to be of an average rate of 3.4 millimeters per year, almost 80% higher
11
 
than the 1.9 millimeter per year rate presented by the IPCC in AR4
12
.  It has been suggested 
that this gap can be explained by the melting of polar ice sheets caused by coastal glacier 
flows, whose potential impact was not included in the IPCC calculations because it was not 
fully understood
13
. Predictions of the magnitude of upcoming future sea level rise are simi-
larly still difficult to estimate
14
, since scientific understanding of the various and cumula-
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tive physical, chemical and biological changes in ocean systems likely to exacerbate the 
effects of sea level rise, such as ocean acidification, changes in wave patterns and changes 
in ocean currents, is still incomplete
15
.  
 
Because uncertainties persist, because some rise has already occurred and because it has up 
until today been occurring at a much faster rate than previously estimated, there is a need 
for legal and policy measures designed to adapt to scenarios of sea level rise. Since the rise 
progresses in a non-linear manner, these measures should integrate a degree of flexibility 
and precaution in order to be effective in a steadily changing context. The international 
community has already expressed its willingness to adopt and integrate such measures
16
, 
but tangible results are still few and far between.  
 
Legal academia, for its part, has devoted some attention to the issues raised by sea level 
rise. Much of the work done so far has however been very sectoral in scope, with few link-
ages attempted between migration issues covered by human rights studies and territorial 
issues relevant to the law of the sea field. Recently efforts have been made to address the 
issues in a more comprehensive manner: the establishment by the International Law Asso-
ciation (ILA) of the Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise in 2012 is a good 
example of this
17
. The Committee’s mandate preconizes a broad scope, with the goal of 
“develop[ing] proposals for the progressive development of international law in relation to 
the possible loss of all or of parts of state territory and maritime zones due to sea-level rise, 
including the impacts on statehood, nationality, and human rights”18. Sea level rise is thus 
an effect of climate change that has been identified as worthy of additional scholarly atten-
tion, even if at it may at first glance come across as well understood and well covered in the 
literature and in practice.  
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2.2 Adaptation 
During the early years of the international climate change regime, adaptation and mitiga-
tion were understood as two separate concepts, the latter seen as worthy of more attention. 
Indeed, mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has always been seen as the main objective 
of the climate regime, while adaptation was not seen as a policy goal but merely as an indi-
cator of a state’s resilience towards climate change. An illustration of this separation can be 
found in article 2 of the UNFCCC: “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations” is stat-
ed as the “ultimate objective of [the] convention” while adaptation is only mentioned as a 
natural attribute of ecosystems to be taken into account when establishing a “time-frame” 
for mitigation. The scientific community also contributed to the adaptation/mitigation di-
chotomy during those years. IPCC Working Group II, for example, effectively devoted 
only 32 pages of its volume in the 1995 second assessment report to adaptation, while over 
200 pages were used to cover mitigation strategies
19
. As a result of these choices, discus-
sion over the elaboration of mitigation strategies largely outweighed talk on adaptation 
measures in the UNFCCC forum from its creation until the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997
20
. 
 
The belief that adaptation should play second fiddle to mitigation however began to wane 
over the last decade. The reasons for this are multiple and complementary. First, reaching 
the Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets proved to be politically and practically more 
difficult than anticipated
21
. Second, a better understanding of the dynamics of climate 
change led to the realization that due to past emissions some change was unavoidable and 
already occurring
22
; according to the IPCC, adaptation is now “the only available and ap-
propriate response” to this impending change23. These new realities contributed to dissipate 
some of the stigma initially associated with adaptation, notably that a focus on adaptation 
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constitutes a defeatist attitude in regard to mitigation efforts
24
 and that adaptation theory is 
based on an overoptimistic faith in scientific progress
25. As a result, the concept’s profile in 
the climate negotiations has considerably grown
26
. The establishment of the Cancun Adap-
tation Framework
27
 and of the Adaptation Committee
28
 at COP-16 in 2010 marks the latest 
milestone in the ongoing effort to reframe adaptation as a central concept in the Post-2020 
agreement set to be adopted in Paris. 
 
Despite recent progress however, adaptation is still ways away from occupying the central 
role its proponents strive for. Indeed, in the mid-2000s, the concept was still a decade be-
hind in its development compared to the mitigation regime according to some analysts
29
.  
The absence of a single widely agreed upon definition of adaptation is an illustration of this 
relative immaturity
30
. Indeed, alternatively to the narrower, more technical definition set 
forth by the IPCC and used in the science and policy communities
31
, some experts opt for 
broader definitions drawing on the neighboring concept of sustainable development
32
. This 
definitional ambiguity has in turn led to shortcomings in funding in two ways. First, some 
authors have referred to a broad definition to argue that the climate regime is not the ap-
propriate forum to discuss the obligations of wealthy nations towards the poor, and that its 
purpose would be better served by focusing exclusively on mitigation measures
33
. This line 
of argument has been picked up by parties to justify their reluctance to contribute funding 
to adaptation. Second, the loose definition opens the door for actors to, despite their prom-
ises for “new and additional funding” through the Cancun Adaptation Framework, recycle 
funding already granted for other types of development aid as funding for climate change 
                                                 
 
24
 Parry et al. (1998), p.741 
25
 Tarlock (1992), p.171 
26
 SEAN-CC (2010), p.1 
27
 UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16 (2010), par.13 
28
 Id., par.20 
29
 Kartha et al., (2006) p.4 
30
 Schipper (2006), p.90 
31
 IPCC (2014), p.1758 
32
 Moser and Boykoff, (2013), p.7 
33
 Posner and Weisbach (2010), p.175 
 7 
adaptation
34
. Further work is therefore needed in order to clarify adaptation’s scope and 
solidify its position in the climate regime. 
 
As this thesis addresses legal issues related sea level rise, it naturally centers its analysis on 
adaptation. Indeed, as mentioned above, experts agree that some sea level rise has already 
occurred and that further rise in the near future is inevitable. In this context, adaptation be-
comes necessary. This does not mean that mitigation or other strategies should be ignored.  
Adaptation and mitigation must be seen as complementary and should not be compart-
mentalized. The synergies between the two facets should be exploited: some adaptation 
strategies to sea level rise, for example the reforestation of coasts vulnerable to erosion, can 
have incidental benefits on mitigation, while successful mitigation can also help keep down 
the costs of adaptation
35
. This thesis thus discusses legal measures to support adaptation to 
sea level rise, but by doing so also touches upon mitigation and other approaches insofar as 
they are relevant for adaptation.  
 
2.3 Pacific Island States 
The Pacific islands region is composed of 21 countries and territories in the tropical Pacific 
Ocean. Of these, nine are fully independent: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu. Seven are territories either of France 
(New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna) of the United States (Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa) or of New Zealand (Tokelau), while five are 
self-governing and constitutionally independent but still have some degree of association 
with the United States (the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau) or 
with New Zealand (the Cook Islands, Niue)
36
. Each of these countries and territories has its 
own unique physical, historical and social characteristics. As such, an in-depth analysis of 
each country’s specific situation is outside the scope of this thesis. Yet every part of this 
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“Sea of Islands”, as Pacific islanders sometimes call their land37, suffers to a varying extent 
from the same two cumulative types of vulnerability: geographical and economic.  
 
As mentioned earlier, sea level rise poses a risk to all of the world’s coastal states. From 
Bangladesh to the United States, no country’s coast is exempt from rising waters and ero-
sion. Pacific island States’ unique geography however places them and their populations on 
the front line against sea level rise, exposing their territories to more important risk than in 
other countries. Indeed, many Pacific Island countries’ entire territories sit only a few me-
ters above sea level. This has two implications: first, even a small increase in sea level 
could lead to important loss of territory. Second, Pacific Island populations have little to no 
possibility of internally relocating to higher ground in response to this rise. In addition to 
the direct consequences of sea level rise, the already fragile natural balance necessary for 
life on these islands risks being upset by secondary effects. In this regard, the three atoll 
island states Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands are particularly at risk: warming 
waters and ocean acidification risk destroying the coral reefs on which their islands rest
38
, 
while increased drought resulting from changes in precipitation threatens their populations’ 
fresh water sources
39
.  
 
In addition to a geographical vulnerability, Pacific island States’ economic situation makes 
them less resilient to the effects of sea level rise. Indeed, developed states possess the fi-
nancial and technological resources necessary to protect themselves from, and adapt to, the 
consequences of sea level rise. The Netherlands, for example, have planned to invest about 
one billion euros annually over the next century in order to protect their coastline and se-
cure their freshwater supplies
40
. Such costly adaptation measures are out of reach for the 
world’s least developed countries (LDCs), whose average GDP per capita is estimated at 
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under 1000$
41
. This economic vulnerability affects many Pacific island States: indeed, out 
of the nine fully independent Pacific Island countries, five are classified as LDCs by the 
United Nations: Kiribati, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu
42
. Funding for 
adaptation was promised to small island developing states during the 16
th
 FCCC Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP) in Cancun
43
, but developed states have so far not lived up to their 
promises
44
.  
 
The double vulnerability of Pacific island States, both geographical and economic, sets 
them apart from other states at risk of sea level rise. It justifies framing the research around 
them as a group by allowing us to predict that Pacific island States are likely to face similar 
types of challenges, although to a varying degree. As such, solutions taking into account 
this double vulnerability are likely to be useful to many of these states. Additionally, it is 
worth noting that all of the independent Pacific island States are parties to both the UN-
FCCC and the UNCLOS. They are also united through the Pacific Islands Forum
45
, as well 
as under the banner of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Network, whose interests 
are represented within the UN system by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
46
. 
This high degree of structural unity could help Pacific island States to have their voices 
heard in the international arena and realize significant progress towards adaptation to sea 
level rise. 
 
To summarize, sea level rise, adaptation and the situation of Pacific island States each pre-
sent characteristics that make them worthwhile focus areas for international legal research. 
The first’s unpredictability and potentially disastrous consequences, the second’s un-
derrepresentation in the climate regime and the third’s common vulnerabilities justify fram-
ing the research around them. But it is these three aspects combined that really present a 
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novel challenge: indeed, the context of adaptation to sea level rise in Pacific island States 
raises questions of international law that have yet to be authoritatively addressed. These 
grey zones, many of them unique to the subject at hand, are precisely what make the topic 
of this research worthy of additional academic attention. The identification and explanation 
of these issues will be the subject of the following chapter of this thesis. 
 
3 Legal Issues 
Scientists agree that climate induced sea level rise is happening and will accelerate in the 
course of the next century, although the exact pace and extent of this acceleration is still 
unclear
47
. It is also agreed that no matter how sea level rise manifests itself, Pacific island 
States and their populations are set to face some effects to which they will have to react and 
adapt. But what consequences do these changes have for international law? Is international 
law currently equipped to function in this evolving context, or will a re-tooling of the exist-
ing rules, possibly even the creation of new norms and frameworks, be necessary in order 
to address problematic normative gaps and enable Pacific island States to adapt to sea level 
rise? This chapter identifies a number of areas of international law that can be expected to 
become increasingly relevant for Pacific island States in scenarios of sea level rise and at-
tempts to determine if norms de lege lata can be relied upon as-is or if de lege ferenda pro-
posals may be required. In doing so, this chapter distinguishes between two types of issues: 
on one hand, issues arising in a context where Pacific island States attempt to adapt to fu-
ture sea level rise (ex-ante) and on the other hand, issues which could arise if adaptation is 
unsuccessful or insufficient (ex-post). 
 
3.1 Ex-Ante Issues 
Two main types of adaptation measures are available for vulnerable populations to adapt to 
sea level rise: in-situ measures, in which efforts are made to enable the local territory to 
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withstand the changing conditions and remain habitable, and ex-situ measures, in which 
relocation away from the vulnerable area is operated in order to provide better living condi-
tions to the population. Legal obstacles stand in the way of the proper articulation of both 
these types of adaptation: this is especially true for the geographically and economically 
vulnerable Pacific island States. The current section highlights these obstacles. 
 
3.1.1 Obstacles to State-to-State Cooperation for Adaptation  
The first paragraph of the preamble to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
states that “the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of human-
kind”48. With this statement in mind, it is possible to identify three sets of international law 
obligations that the global community of states shares in the context of climate change: 
mitigation of the effects of climate change, adaptation to the effects for which mitigation 
was ineffective and protection of people negatively affected by those effects
49
. The first 
two are covered in the international climate law treaty regime: their relationship to one an-
other was discussed in section 2.2, where the existence of potential synergies between them 
was mentioned. One such synergy is here highlighted through an analysis and comparison 
of the relevant provisions. 
 
On one hand, States Parties to climate treaties are subjected to substantive obligations on 
adaptation, as will be highlighted in the following subsection. These obligations could 
serve as a legal basis for Pacific island State requests for adaptation assistance. States’ mit-
igation obligations, on the other hand, are part of an array of negative obligations, or obli-
gations “to abstain from”, rooted both in international treaties as well as in customary in-
ternational law. These negative obligations could also become a basis for action on adapta-
tion, inasmuch as their non-fulfillment could incur states’ responsibility and serve as 
grounds for reparation claims by Pacific island States and other states negatively affected 
                                                 
 
48
 UNFCCC (1992), preamble par.1 
49
 Kälin and Schrepfer (2012), p.17 
 12 
by climate change. A review of each of these two categories of obligations and a commen-
tary on their practical use to Pacific island States is the subject of this section. 
 
3.1.1.1 Positive Obligations for Climate Change Adaptation: The UNFCCC Regime 
Even though the two legally binding multilateral climate treaties, the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol, mainly address climate change mitigation, they both also contain provi-
sions that codify obligations for States Parties regarding adaptation.  
 
In the UNFCCC, all Parties to the Convention commit to “formulate, implement, publish 
and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programs containing […] 
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change”50, as well as to “cooperate in 
preparing for the adaptation to the impacts of climate change”51. Developed country Parties 
listed in Annex II of the Convention  in addition commit to “assist the developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”52 and to “take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and knowhow to other Parties, particularly developing Parties […] [in order 
to] support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies 
of developing country Parties”53. Small island States’ specific needs and concerns are to be 
given “full consideration”54 in the implementation of these commitments, as are those of 
other categories of particularly vulnerable developing country Parties. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol does not introduce any new obligations for States regarding adaptation, 
but rather reaffirms and further elaborates the content of some of the commitments taken 
under the Framework Convention. Notably, it specifies that “adaptation technologies and 
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methods for improving spatial planning” are important elements of the national and region-
al programs referred to in article 4(1) b) of the Convention
55
 and that information on adap-
tation measures is to be included in the Parties’ communications to the Conference Secre-
tariat
56
. The Protocol also specifies that money generated through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), one of the four flexibility mechanisms introduced to help Parties with 
quantified emission reduction obligations to meet their targets, is to be used to “assist de-
veloping country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change to meet the costs of adaptation”57. This last provision is of great practical rele-
vance
58
 as it has led to the establishment of the Adaptation Fund in 2000
59
. The Adaptation 
Fund, along with the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF)
60
, the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF)
61
 and the Green Climate Fund (GCF)
62
 are currently the main chan-
nels established on a treaty basis for climate change adaptation funding. The adaptation 
funds of the climate regime have however suffered from underfunding
63
 as well as govern-
ance and transparency problems
64
. In addition, the four funds share very similar mandates: 
this has led to overlaps between them, thereby reducing efficiency
65
.  
 
Because of the challenges faced by the Funds, there is a possibility that Pacific island 
States end up not receiving the adaptation assistance they are entitled to as per the articles 
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Two additional factors contribute to this uncer-
tainty. First, the language used in the text of the provisions, such as “take all practicable 
steps to” and “assist”, suggests that no individual state has the obligation to bear the full 
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costs of adaptation in developing countries
66
. This, along with the fact that each state’s re-
quired contribution to the shared effort has so far not been quantified, opens the door for 
Parties to contribute in an insufficient manner while still technically meeting their obliga-
tion. Second, even if a state completely ignores its obligation of assistance, there is current-
ly no legal mechanism for recipient countries to enforce compliance
67
.  
 
There have been some developments regarding the establishment of a Convention mecha-
nism for loss and damage resulting inter alia from insufficient adaptation: institutional ar-
rangements for such a mechanism were adopted at the 19
th
 COP in Warsaw in 2013
68
 but 
are still at an initial stage. A loss and damage mechanism would be useful on two levels.  
First, it would provide a way for recipient states to seek compensation for failures to pro-
vide assistance. Second, as observed by Verheyen, it could incidentally serve as “an added 
motivation to tighten effectiveness on mitigation and adaptation practice”69. The mecha-
nism however still faces strong opposition from some States Parties, notably the United 
States
70
. Its operationalization is expected to take some years: a review of its structure, 
mandate and effectiveness is set for the 22
nd
 COP in 2016
71
. Loss and damage is thus still 
an emerging concept in the UNFCCC regime
72
 and cannot be considered a solution as of 
today. 
 
Overall, relying on climate treaty provisions de lege lata is not an optimal solution for Pa-
cific island States to secure assistance for adaptation. Doing so would place them in a situa-
tion where they could be dependent on contributions from other actors without the preroga-
tives necessary to ensure a constant and predictable delivery of these contributions. This 
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could place Pacific island States in a position of instability, which would limit their capaci-
ty to adapt. 
 
3.1.1.2 Negative Obligations: Adaptation Assistance as Reparation 
State-to-state obligations for adaptation assistance could also be inferred from the more 
general obligation to refrain from causing transboundary harm. The prohibition of such 
harm is a well-established customary rule in international law. It was crystallized in the 
1941 Trail Smelter arbitration between the United States and Canada. The arbitral tribunal 
in the case stated that: 
[U]nder the principles of international law, […] no State has the right to use or 
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to 
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of se-
rious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.
73
 
 
The principle was reaffirmed in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
74
 and in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development
75
. It is also codified in many international 
treaties. Of special importance to Pacific island States, the principle has been referred to in 
the climate regime in the preamble of the UNFCCC
76
, as well as in the context of the pro-
tection of the marine environment in article 194.2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
77
. Its status as a rule of customary international law was 
reiterated, and its geographical scope broadened, in the 1996 International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The 
Court here indeed stated that “the general obligation of States to ensure that activities with-
in their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States”  also applies to 
“areas beyond national control”78.  
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The “no-harm rule”, as it is often referred to, can hence be said to contain an obligation for 
States not to cause environmental damage outside their territory themselves, as well as a 
corollary obligation to supervise the activities of actors operating in their territory in order 
to ensure that these activities do not cause environmental damage. This is known as a “due 
diligence” obligation79. Under international law, a breach by a State of one of its obliga-
tions constitutes an internationally wrongful act and entails that State’s responsibility: this 
principle can be traced back to the Permanent Court of International Justice’s 1928 decision 
in the Chorzów Factory Case
80
, and was more recently restated in the ILC’s 2001 Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter ILC 
Draft Articles)
81
. In a scenario where the greenhouse gas emissions originating in other 
countries cause damage to the environment of Pacific island States, the latter could attempt 
to invoke the former’s breach of its obligation under the no-harm rule and demand repara-
tion. According to the ILC Draft Articles, reparation can be provided through restitution, 
compensation or satisfaction, either singly or in combination
82
. Restitution, which implies a 
return to the situation in place before the occurrence of the wrongful act
83
, could be impos-
sible in the context of climate change: sea level rise and coastal erosion can hardly be un-
done. Compensation
84
 would be a more realistic form of reparation. This financial compen-
sation could serve as adaptation assistance by supporting national adaptation programs and 
other measures to limit further damage. 
 
A state attempting to invoke another state’s responsibility for damages resulting from the 
effects of climate change would however likely meet certain obstacles. Indeed, it has been 
established that four elements are necessary in order to successfully invoke state responsi-
bility under international law: (i) a damaging activity attributable to a state; (ii) a link be-
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tween this damaging activity and a breach of an international obligation; (iii) a causal link 
between the activity and the damage and; (iv) demonstration that the breached international 
obligation was owed to the claiming state
85
. Of these, elements (ii) and (iii) in particular 
could prove difficult to establish in the present context.  
 
First, it could be difficult for claimant states to demonstrate the illegal nature of emissions 
of greenhouse gases as required by element (ii). Those emissions, it can be argued, were 
not unlawful under international law until relatively recently, and are now only so for Par-
ties to the UNFCCC as they do not yet constitute customary international law obligations. 
Tol and Verheyen suggest that the adoption of the UNFCCC by the Parties in 1992 proves 
their acknowledgement of the unlawfulness of excessive emissions and that as such, their 
lack of action on emission reduction from that moment on could constitute a breach of their 
obligation of due diligence under the no-harm rule
86
. But it is not clear if emissions predat-
ing that moment could be qualified as unlawful. It can be argued that the dynamics of cli-
mate change were not as well understood at the time and the harmfulness of greenhouse 
gases not as clearly established: consequently, the degree to which States had to supervise 
these emissions – the required standard of care – might have been lower. Article 13 of the 
ILC Draft Articles states that “an act of a State does not constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act 
occurs”87. Considering that studies by climate scientists show that the world is currently 
experiencing the effects of emissions dating as far back as 20 years ago
88
, it could be possi-
ble for states to claim that, at the time the damaging activity was committed, their obliga-
tion of due-diligence either did not exist or was much less stringent than after the adoption 
of the UNFCCC. As such, they could argue that their previous emissions do not fall under 
Draft Article 2’s definition of an internationally wrongful act and that their responsibility is 
therefore not engaged. 
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The second obstacle to invoking states’ responsibility for climate change damage pertains 
to the causal link between the emissions and the damage experienced by the claimant state. 
There is today scientific consensus over the anthropogenic nature of climate change. As the 
IPCC stated in its Fifth Assessment Report, “human influence on the climate system is 
clear. This is evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, 
positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate system”89. 
This leads to believe that a general causal link between the emissions of greenhouse gases 
and the effects of climate change could be established. In order for an emitter State’s re-
sponsibility to be invoked, however, the additional demonstration of a direct causal link 
between that State’s own emissions and the damage felt by the claimant is needed: this spe-
cific causation could be difficult to prove
90
. Indeed, the causes and effects of climate 
change damage can occur very far away from each other geographically, and as explained 
above an important chronological gap also separates them. In addition, the causes of cli-
mate change are very diffuse: every country, albeit to a different degree, can be said to 
have contributed to it. While the ILC Draft Articles recognize that there can be cases where 
more than one state may be held responsible for the same wrongful act
91
, the Commentary 
to those articles distinguishes between these and cases “where several States by separate 
internationally wrongful conduct have contributed to the same damage”92, for example cas-
es where “several States might contribute to polluting a river by the separate discharge of 
pollutants”93. According to the Commentary, “in such cases, the responsibility of each par-
ticipating State is determined individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference 
to its own international obligations”94. Climate change damage can be likened to this latter 
category: each state’s separate emission of greenhouse gases contributed to the problem. 
Following this reasoning, it could be argued that an affected state needs to establish specif-
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ic causation between an emitter state’s own conduct and the harm suffered, which would, 
as observed by Kälin and Schrepfer, “impose an extremely high burden of proof on affect-
ed states”95. 
 
The uncertainties outlined above would thus make it difficult for states affected by climate 
change, like Pacific island States, to invoke emitter states’ responsibility in order to obtain 
compensation for their loss. The current state of affairs does not hint towards any progress 
in the matter: as noted by Brunée, “it seems that states are not anxious to resolve the ambi-
guities, as they serve as a convenient buffer against state responsibility”96. As such, from a 
legal perspective, it is not clear whether the rules on state responsibility constitute an ave-
nue through which Pacific island States could obtain adaptation assistance as compensation 
for climate change damage. It must however be noted that the concept of state responsibil-
ity, even if legally unsettled, can still be of some use for damaged states as a form of politi-
cal leverage. The 2010 initiative of the then-president of Palau is a good example of this. 
His campaign for the submission of a request to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on the 
topic of states’ obligations regarding greenhouse gas emissions from their territories97 has 
as of today not received the support necessary to be followed through, but has led to in-
creased dialog between Palau and major emitters like the US and Germany through the 
UNFCCC forum
98
.  
 
3.1.2 Obstacles to Gateways for Adaptive Migration 
Even before the advent of anthropogenic climate change, the inhabitants of Pacific island 
States were often accustomed to living in and adapting to precarious environmental condi-
tions. As Barnett and Campbell note, “some of the environments in which [Pacific island] 
communities have survived are remarkably inhospitable, and that communities have sur-
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vived in them for so long is testimony to their ability to adapt to difficult circumstances”99. 
They state as an example atoll islands, where despite scarce resources and frequent extreme 
weather events communities have lived for over 2000 years. These traditionally resilient 
communities have however had to face new challenges over the last two centuries: high 
demographic growth and rapid urbanization, both results of a shift from a subsistence-
based lifestyle to a market-based economy under colonial rule, brought along increasing 
social tensions as well as economic and environmental problems
100
. These problems are 
often interrelated: for example, the risks to health caused by the high prevalence of infec-
tious diseases in Pacific Island urban areas can be linked to, among other factors, over-
population, absence of proper sanitation facilities and poor land quality
101
. In this context, 
climate change acts not as a separate threat to Pacific Island populations but rather as an 
additional factor exacerbating existing weaknesses. For instance, in the aforementioned 
case of health risks, climate induced sea level rise increases the occurrence of floods and 
groundwater contamination, both likely to lead to more outbreaks of disease
102
.  
 
In a scenario in which the already precarious living conditions in Pacific Island countries 
worsen due to the effects of sea level rise, migration would be a potential solution for the 
islands’ inhabitants. According to some, if no further mitigation measures are taken and no 
effort is made to protect vulnerable groups where they stand, migration could even become 
the only alternative
103
. If that is the case, it can be expected that at least some of the migra-
tion would be international because of the Pacific Islands’ geographical situation. In inter-
national law, forced migration is conceptualized as a protection issue, which as mentioned 
in the previous section is the third category of obligations shared by UNFCCC member 
states. Adaptive migration however differs from protective migration in scope and applica-
tion: can established protection frameworks apply to it? In an attempt to answer this ques-
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tion, two potentially relevant areas of human rights law will be analyzed: international ref-
ugee law and the norms underpinning complementary protection mechanisms. 
 
3.1.2.1 International Refugee Law 
For many, “environmental refugee” is what first comes to mind when the topic of climate-
induced migration is discussed. The term was popularized by UNEP Researcher Essam El-
Hinnawi in the 1980s, who defined environmental refugees as 
Those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily 
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or 
triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of their life. By “environmental disruption” in this definition is meant any 
physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) 
that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life.
104
 
 
The term has since been frequently referred to in social sciences fields
105
. More recently, 
various authors have suggested the existence of different subcategories of environmental 
refugees, based on criteria such as the nature of the environmental threat causing the migra-
tion or the duration of the displacement
106
. Possibly because of the powerful images it 
evokes, the notion has also been mentioned in high-level political declarations
107
 and regu-
larly picked up by the media
108
. Proponents of the environmental refugee concept argue 
that people displaced against their will due to natural causes deserve to be eligible to simi-
lar protection as those fleeing their country in fear of violence or persecution. They should 
thus benefit from the non-refoulement rule
109
, which guarantees the right not to be returned 
to their home country if doing so would constitute a threat to their life or freedom. 
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Several authors however disapprove of the use of the term, which they consider mislead-
ing
110
. Indeed, in the different international refugee law instruments, the word “refugee” is 
clearly defined and has a limited scope. Its definition can be found in article 1a) (2) of the 
main multilateral agreement on the matter, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (hereafter referred to as Refugee Convention), as amended by article 1(2) of the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.  According to this article, the term “refu-
gee” applies to 
[A]ny person who […] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group or po-
litical opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual res-
idence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.
111
 
 
It must be noted that a person must meet all of the requirements of article 1a) (2) in order to 
qualify as a refugee as per the definition of the Convention
112
.  As such, it is unlikely that 
climate migrants could benefit from the status, since the cause of their movement does not 
fall under the five grounds of persecution listed in the article. Indeed, the effects of climate 
change, even though they might de facto affect certain vulnerable groups more than others, 
cannot be said to constitute an act of persecution. The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) agrees with this interpretation: it states that “climate-induced dis-
placement was not considered by the drafters when formulating the above definition”113. 
The Committee however indicates that in some cases, migration resulting from environ-
mental causes could potentially qualify for refugee status and protection. It gives the exam-
ple of victims of environmental disasters fleeing their country as a result of their govern-
ment deliberately failing to assist them in order to persecute them on one of the five 
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grounds listed in the definition. The Committee nevertheless concludes that “such cases are 
likely to be few” 114. 
 
In some countries, court practice has already begun to emerge on this issue. The New Zea-
land Court of Appeal’s 2014 decision in the Teitiota case115 more specifically confirms that 
Pacific islanders migrating to neighboring countries in response to the effects of sea level 
rise fall outside of the Refugee Convention’s definition of refugee. In the case, applicant 
Ioane Teitiota, a Kiribati national who had overstayed his residence permit to New Zea-
land, had appealed a decision of the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal 
denying him the status of refugee under the country’s Immigration Act. In its judgement, 
the Court confirms the first instance decision, which stated that since article 129(1) of the 
Immigration Act based admissibility to refugee status on the criteria of article 1(a) (2) of 
the Refugee Convention, the status could not be granted to Teitiota because the effects of 
sea level rise did not qualify as persecution under the Convention
116
. The Court concludes 
by stating that “no-one should read this judgment as downplaying the importance of cli-
mate change. […] The point this judgment makes is that climate change and its effects on 
countries like Kiribati is not appropriately addressed under the Refugee Convention”117. 
 
In parallel to the Refugee Convention, relevant instruments can be found at the regional 
level. These agreements have the advantage of recognizing additional criteria that could 
potentially serve as grounds for migrants from countries affected by climate change to ob-
tain the status of refugee. Both the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Organization of American States Car-
tagena Declaration of Refugees indeed include as refugees people compelled to flee due to 
events “seriously disturbing public order”118. It would however still be problematic for Pa-
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cific islanders to meet the criteria set forth in these agreements: similarly to the Refugee 
Convention, they include in their definition the requirement that a person must be “com-
pelled to leave”119 or already “have fled”120 his or her home country in order to benefit 
from the status of refugee. This requirement is ill fitted for Pacific islanders, who are more 
likely to require pre-emptive assistance while still in their home country. What’s more, the 
exact scope of the additional criterion has yet to be clearly established by state practice
121
. 
In this context, the effects of sea level rise, more gradual in nature than those of sudden 
natural disasters, risk not being recognized as “events disturbing public order”. It thus ap-
pears that regional treaties, in a similar manner to the Refugee Convention, cannot be relied 
upon in its current state by Pacific islanders migrating in response to sea level rise.  
 
3.1.2.2 Complementary Protection 
The above-discussed framework of international refugee law is in fact a subset, or lex spe-
cialis, of the broader field of international human rights law
122
. Outside of this subset, there 
are other norms that can be relied upon by persons whose rights are threatened by the ef-
fects of climate change. All three of the main multilateral human rights treaties, namely the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights 
(ICESCR), establish rights whose fulfillment requires a sufficiently safe and hospitable 
environment. The international community has acknowledged this in the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration
123
. The necessity of a clean environment as a prerequisite for other rights has 
also been referred to by ICJ judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros judgement. There, he writes that “the protection of the environment is […] a 
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vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous hu-
man rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself”124.  
 
Additionally to the right to health
125
 and the right to life
126
, the enjoyment of a number of 
recognized fundamental human rights can be said to depend on a healthy environment, in-
cluding but not restricted to the right to an adequate standard of living
127
 and the right to 
safe and healthy work conditions
128
. It has been argued that in order for environmental con-
siderations to receive the attention they deserve in the field of human rights, a distinct hu-
man right to a clean or satisfactory environment should be recognized
129
. As of today how-
ever, this has yet to happen: textual references to a right to a clean environment remain 
“largely absent from the relevant global and regional treaties”130. 
 
In the context of migration, human rights norms serve three main purposes
131
. First, they 
set out minimum standards of treatment that must be provided by their home state. Second, 
if those standards are not respected, they can provide a basis on which protection, and relo-
cation, may be sought: this has been defined as complementary protection
132
. Third, in sim-
ilar fashion to what was required of the home state, the human rights norms require of the 
country granting complementary protection to observe minimum standards of treatment in 
accordance with human rights principles. 
 
Complementary protection, as its name implies, is a protection regime that complements 
the Refugee Convention. It can be defined as “a form of human rights or humanitarian pro-
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tection triggered by States’ expanded non-refoulement obligations”133. As complementary 
protection is not part of the international refugee law treaty framework, it is operated by 
domestic law. As such, the specific procedure of different states’ mechanisms varies, as 
does the term used to define the complementary protection: “de facto refugee status”, “B 
status”, “humanitarian asylum” and “temporary protected status cases” are but a few exam-
ples of terms used
134
. All these domestic mechanisms however share the same main func-
tion: to set up a process for states to grant protection to individuals falling outside of the 
Refugee Convention but entitled to protection under the human rights law principle of non-
refoulement, which is today considered a part of customary international law
135
. 
 
Complementary protection could potentially be relied upon by migrants requiring protec-
tion but not considered as refugees under the 1951 Convention. Upon review of different 
states’ domestic protection mechanisms136, it is however possible to identify two recurring 
obstacles to the application of complementary protection to Pacific Islanders. The first lies 
in the fact that environmental harm stemming from the effects of climate change has yet to 
be recognized as the single cause of a breach of human rights. Indeed, although it has been 
recognized by courts that man-made environmental degradation could have human rights 
implications
137
, the same is not true for the effects of climate change, which are difficult to 
attribute to a single actor. Knowing that a demand for complementary protection must be in 
response to an identifiable breach of minimum standards by the home state, the diffuse na-
ture of the causes of climate change thus would make it difficult for a claimant to establish 
a causal link strong enough to obtain protection. 
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The second obstacle is the requirement of “specific harm” imposed by a number of com-
plementary protection mechanisms. According to this criterion, an applicant must demon-
strate that his or her individual situation justifies the protection and that the harm invoked is 
not widespread or generalized. The Legal Services division of the Immigration and Refu-
gee Board of Canada, for example, has stated that in the case of a person applying for com-
plementary protection under section 97 of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act
138
, a “claim based on natural catastrophes such as drought, famine, earthquakes, 
etc. will not satisfy the definition as the risk is generalized”139. 
 
The judgement in a 2014 New Zealand case illustrates how these two limitations can mani-
fest themselves in the context of Pacific islanders and sea level rise
140
. The case concerns 
two citizens of Tuvalu who had filed humanitarian appeals in order to obtain the right to 
remain in New Zealand. They had based their claims on the close bond uniting their family 
and their children to New Zealand as well as on the risk the family faced of suffering the 
adverse impacts of climate change and the associated socio-economic depravation if they 
were returned to their home country. The Tribunal gave way to the appellants’ claim and 
granted them residency on the basis of their personal situation. It however notably ab-
stained from reaching any conclusion as to their claims in relation to the effects of climate 
change
141
, instead justifying its decision on the “cumulative basis”142 of their other argu-
ments. Additionally, the Tribunal reaffirmed that “the evidence in appeals such as this must 
establish not simply the existence of a matter of broad humanitarian concern, but that there 
are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature such that it would be unjust or un-
duly harsh to deport the particular appellant from New Zealand”143. The case thus demon-
strates how the causal link and the “specific harm” criteria are applied in situations involv-
ing Pacific islanders. It can be concluded that these criteria could act as obstacles to the 
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application of complementary protection mechanisms in cases where appellants’ situations 
do not otherwise qualify them for residency. 
 
It must be noted that some states address environmental migration more directly in their 
domestic complementary protection mechanisms. Sweden and Finland have indeed adopted 
asylum legislation explicitly granting similar protection as is granted to refugees to victims 
of “environmental disaster”144 and “environmental catastrophe”145 respectively. The Swe-
dish mechanism would not apply to victims of sea level rise, since “according to the Divi-
sion for Migration and Asylum Policy at the Swedish Ministry of Justice, [it] is based on a 
preparatory foundation that limits its applicability to cases of sudden environmental disas-
ters and does not extend to cases of continuous environmental decline”146. The Finnish 
mechanism, on the other hand, could apply to sea level rise and other slow onset phenome-
na, since its travaux préparatoires “include a specific reference to cases when the alien’s 
home environment has become too dangerous for human habitation either because of hu-
man actions or as a result of natural disaster”147. National legislation modeled after the 
Finnish approach could thus be a solution for Pacific island States. As of today, however, 
Finland’s mechanism is the exception to the rule148 and does not constitute an appropriate 
solution for Pacific island migrants, especially so because of the great distance separating 
the countries. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that in their current state, neither international refugee law nor 
the existing complementary protection mechanisms constitute appropriate frameworks in 
respect to the adaptation needs of Pacific islanders affected by sea level rise. Further inno-
vation is needed in order to define climate migrants’ status under international law. Nota-
bly, it remains to be determined whether climate migrants should benefit from protection in 
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virtue of their status, or if a legal mechanism with roots outside the human rights protection 
paradigm would be more appropriate. 
 
3.2 Ex-Post Issues 
While the previous section analysed existing frameworks with a view to assessing their use 
for ex-ante adaptation to future scenarios of sea level rise, the current section instead opts 
for an ex-post approach. Indeed, it attempts to underline the legal issues which could arise 
in contexts where sea level rise, either because of insufficient or ineffective adaptation, 
ends up having significant consequences on Pacific islands’ territories and populations. The 
first part of the analysis focuses on the effects of sea level rise on the maritime zones of 
Pacific island States. An important rise in sea level could also have implications for the 
island nations’ sovereignty and, ultimately, statehood: this is discussed in the second part of 
the analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Baselines and Maritime Zones 
Pacific island States' maritime zones are of significant importance to those countries. They 
are geographically very substantial, especially in relation to the islands’ often small land 
territories
149
. The resources situated in these maritime areas are also greatly relied upon by 
island States for income: even if they traditionally have not exploited the fish stocks in their 
maritime zones on a commercial scale
150
, many of them benefit from the sale of fishing 
rights within their maritime zones to foreign-owned operations
151
. The licensing of rights 
for deep-sea mining is another profitable activity that some Pacific island States have 
planned to establish in the future, although environmental and commercial feasibility con-
cerns appear to have slowed down the development of this industry
152
. Any negative im-
pact on these resources or their ownership could thus have important consequences for the 
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islands’ already fragile economies and would further diminish their capacity to adapt to 
climate change. Sea level rise, by leading to the submergence of coastal land, could alter 
Pacific island States’ geography to the point where uncertainties regarding their rights over 
some extents of their maritime zones could arise. A review of the relevant international law 
provisions confirms this possibility. 
 
The provisions pertaining to coastal state sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over its adjacent maritime zones are found in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They are based on the principle that “the land dominates the 
sea” which is today considered to be a general principle of international law153. The UN-
CLOS provisions in fact refine the scope of the principle, leading it to have “a decreasing 
effect upon legal regimes of the sea when the distance from the coast increases”154. 
 
The main line from which maritime zones are determined is called the baseline. The nor-
mal baseline is defined in article 5 of the UNCLOS as “the low-water line along the coast 
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State”. Under certain 
circumstances, states can trace their baseline in an alternate manner to the one prescribed in 
article 5. Islands situated on atolls or having fringing reefs can draw their baseline from the 
low-water line of those reefs
155
, while localities where the coastline is deeply indented, cut 
into or bordered by a fringe of islands
156
 and areas where the coastline is highly unstable 
due to the presence of a delta and other natural conditions
157
 are allowed to trace straight 
baselines joining determined points. Archipelagic states are also entitled to, under certain 
conditions, draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of its islands or reefs as an 
alternative to the normal baseline
158
. 
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From the baseline, the coastal state’s different maritime zones are measured. Waters inside 
the baseline are considered the internal waters of the state
159
, while the area extending up to 
twelve nautical miles outside of the baseline is defined as its territorial sea
160
. Beyond and 
adjacent to the territorial sea lies the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends up to 
200 nautical miles from the baseline
161
. The territorial sea, geographically nearer to the 
state’s territory and smaller in size, is subjected to a higher degree of control by the coastal 
state than the EEZ. Indeed, the coastal state exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea, its 
bed and subsoil as well as the air space over it
162
. In contrast, the EEZ is subjected to more 
limited control, as specified in article 56 of the UNCLOS: the coastal state’s prerogatives 
over the Zone mainly concern sovereign rights over the exploitation and management of 
the natural resources in its water column, seabed and subsoil, as well as certain aspects of 
jurisdiction
163
. 
 
In addition to the rights over the territorial sea and the EEZ, certain rights are granted under 
the UNCLOS to the coastal state over its continental shelf. This area is defined as “the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea” and can ex-
tend to the furthest of either 200 nautical miles from the baseline, which is in line with the 
limit of the EEZ, or the outer edge of the continental margin
164
. The latter point is meas-
ured by taking into account the geomorphological characteristics of the state’s shelf165 and 
cannot exceed a distance of 350 nautical miles from the baseline or 100 nautical miles from 
the 2500 metre isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2500 metres)
166
. Coastal states 
wishing to avail themselves of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline must submit information about their measurements to the Commission on 
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the Limits of the Continental Shelf, who then makes recommendations on the basis of 
which the coastal state establishes its “outer” continental shelf limit167.  
 
Even though UNCLOS itself does not expressly confirm the ambulatory nature of base-
lines
168
, the fact that it provides for two situations where maritime zone limits are perma-
nently fixed, namely for the establishment of an extended continental shelf under article 
76(8) and for the establishment of straight baselines in highly unstable delta situations un-
der article 7(2) – the so-called “Bangladesh exception” – has led many experts to conclude 
that other baselines established by the Convention are a contrario not fixed
169
. According 
to this interpretation, as sea level rise affects the geographical features that serve as relevant 
points for the determination of the outer limits of the zone, for example by causing the low-
tide line to move closer to the coast or by submerging low-tide elevations, it would cause 
the baseline to shift, moving inwards towards the land. The boundaries of the maritime 
zones delimited by the baseline would then move accordingly: the consequence of this 
would be an overall landward shift of the maritime area under control of the coastal state, 
the outermost portion of the former EEZ becoming part of the high seas and the outermost 
portion of the former territorial sea falling under the EEZ regime
170
. This would effectively 
shorten the radius of maritime area over which the coastal state is entitled to exercise its 
rights. 
 
Sea level rise could in this manner significantly affect the coastal rights of Pacific island 
States under international law. In addition to the UNCLOS, many islands’ domestic legal 
provisions on the subject further contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the nature of 
their baselines. Indeed, the maritime zone laws of most Pacific island States were prepared 
with the help of the Commonwealth Secretariat during the 1970s
171
: this was done follow-
ing a common model according to which the baseline is defined as the low-water line, ex-
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cept for atoll islands or islands with fringing reefs. The domestic laws of all fourteen either 
fully independent (Fiji
172
, Kiribati
173
, Nauru
174
, Papua New Guinea
175
, Samoa
176
, the Solo-
mon Islands
177
, Tonga
178
, Tuvalu
179
 and Vanuatu
180
) or constitutionally independent (the 
Cook Islands
181
, the Federated States of Micronesia
182
, the Marshall Islands
183
, Niue
184
 and 
Palau
185
) Pacific island States follow this model. The language used in the domestic legisla-
tion can be seen as corroborating the ambulatory baseline interpretation of UNCLOS provi-
sions. Moreover, it is possible that for Pacific islands, the domestic provisions themselves 
could prove problematic even without a clear answer as to the nature of baselines under the 
UNCLOS. As one author explains, “in the absence of any declaration of straight or archipe-
lagic baselines, should the low-water line move, the baselines will move – not as an effect 
of the operation of international law but rather as an effect of these states’ own domestic 
law”186. 
 
Because of these domestic provisions, Pacific island States that have declared and pub-
lished straight or archipelagic baselines, namely Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, 
Tuvalu, The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu
187
, could conversely benefit from a “presump-
tion of permanence”188 regarding the validity of their published coordinates and conse-
quently of their maritime zones. This presumption however does not mean that those states’ 
rights are secured indefinitely: the submergence of one of the points used to draw a base-
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line could still de facto lead to the loss of that baseline and thus affect the size of the mari-
time zones claimable by a tate
189
. In addition to not qualifying as proper archipelagic base-
line points, islands, even if not completely submerged, could altogether lose their right to 
an economic zone and a continental shelf if they become unable to “sustain human habita-
tion or [an] economic life of their own”190. 
 
In cases where coordinates have been published, this would not happen automatically. A 
situation could however arise where another tate, having an interest in the area in question, 
could be tempted to oppose a geographical change of circumstance to the presumed base-
line, for example in order to gain access to the resources within this area. The possibility of 
disagreement over baselines and maritime zones could encourage wasteful spending by 
states wishing to protect their baselines and lead to conflict
191
. This should preferably be 
avoided, as states cannot afford to use their resources in a counterproductive manner when 
they could instead be invested in adaptation measures. More generally, the effects of sea 
level rise on baseline and maritime zone legislation could undermine the certainty, predict-
ability and stability that the law of maritime delimitation seeks to establish
192
. For these 
reasons, the law of the sea provisions regarding baselines, maritime zones and coastal state 
rights must be clarified. 
  
3.2.2 Statehood and Sovereignty 
Depending on the extent of the rise in sea-level and the success of ex-ante adaptation 
measures, some Pacific island States could face consequences more far-reaching than a loss 
of rights over maritime zones. Indeed, the low-lying atoll island states Kiribati, Tuvalu and 
the Marshall Islands, because of their unique geography, could undergo changes which 
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would make them practically uninhabitable
193
. In such a case, these states could then find 
themselves in a position where they no longer fulfill some of the required criteria for state-
hood: this could put their very existence as a state under international law at risk. 
 
The four basic criteria required in order to qualify for statehood are listed in article 1 of the 
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. They are: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states
194
. As one leading expert on the subject puts it, statehood has no 
unique generally accepted definition but can be said to be “a form of standing”195 which 
entails three main exclusive legal attributes: the ability to act in the international sphere, the 
exclusive competence over internal affairs and the prerogative to not be subjected to inter-
national jurisdiction without consent
196
. 
 
For Pacific atoll island States, continued fulfillment of the territory criterion in particular 
could prove difficult in the face of important sea level rise. First, in some climate change 
scenarios, most or all of their territory could be inundated and disappear
197
. Second, even 
before total submergence were to happen, population displacement due to gradual loss of 
habitability could eventually lead to islands unable to sustain a permanent population: it is 
not certain that this uninhabitable land would qualify as “defined territory” as per the Mon-
tevideo Convention criterion
198
. As all four criteria must be met in order to confirm the 
existence of a state, “it has generally been argued that […] extinction of states must be de-
termined by reference to these same criteria”199. Applying this reasoning to the case at 
hand, the state would cease to exist from the moment the territory criterion is no longer 
met
200
. The legal consequences of the extinction of a state would be multiple and grave. For 
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the former state, they could range from loss of maritime rights
201
 to loss of international 
standing altogether
202
, while for its inhabitants they could lead to statelessness
203
.    
 
A closer look at state practice and doctrine on the subject however reveals that the above-
explained rationale has not been accepted as the fact of the matter, but has rather been used 
as “only a starting point for further examination in the search for a modern concept of the 
notion”204. Indeed, the criteria for statehood enumerated in the Montevideo Convention 
have until today been articulated in the context of the creation and succession of states. 
These two topics have been well covered in international law
205
, in contrast to state extinc-
tion which was until recently considered as being mostly of theoretical interest
206
. The dis-
solution of a state necessarily entails some form of succession by one or more other states: 
indeed, international law on the matter provides that states can be dissolved either as a con-
sequence of merger with another state, absorption into an existing state or by dismember-
ment into new states
207
. As was noted in reference to the situation in Somalia, “no provi-
sion [was] made for a state which collapses to the point of being totally defunct”208. It is 
thus unclear whether the Montevideo Convention criteria can be applied in the same man-
ner in cases where no succession is possible. 
 
This notion of state succession can be said to constitute one aspect of the fundamental pre-
sumption that both international law and its main subject, the state, are to be in existence 
forever
209
. The other aspect of this presumption is the notion of state continuity
210
. Continu-
ity and succession are distinct and complementary: in past situations where drastic changes 
occurred to a state’s territory, government or population, the state either continued to exist 
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despite these changes or was replaced by another state in respect to some or all of its terri-
tory or population
211
. International law, to fulfill its goal of maintaining global order and 
peace, depends on the stability of international relations and on preservation of the status 
quo where possible and appropriate
212
. Hence, because of the stability it provides, continui-
ty has been described as preferable over state succession in cases where a state’s existence 
is unclear: the former “preserves legal relations despite changes in the subjects of those 
relations […] to a much greater degree than [the latter], which is often marked by disconti-
nuity”213.  
 
In the case of Pacific atoll island States, the territory criterion of statehood is compromised 
but the other criteria might still remain fulfilled: the doctrine of state continuity could 
therefore be relied upon. The case at hand is however fundamentally different from past 
situations where continuity was presumed in the wake of loss of territory. In those cases, 
territory was only temporarily removed from a state’s control214, either because of foreign 
occupation
215
 or government failure
216
. The territory of atoll island States, in contrast, risks 
physically disappearing, if not forever then at least for the foreseeable future. In this con-
text, the island States, in addition to losing control over their territory, would also lose any 
plausible claim to it
217
. This could make the application of the presumption of continuity 
much more difficult, especially in the long term: it is not clear how long the other criteria 
of statehood would continue to be fulfilled or how effective a “deterritorialized state” could 
be at fulfilling its functions. For example, a Pacific atoll island State with a diaspora relo-
cated in a multitude of different counties with no possibility to return could potentially, in a 
few generations’ time, end up without an effective population if the descendents of the is-
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landers become eligible to, and decide to adopt, the nationality of their host country, which 
might at this point have become more attractive and practical for them. 
 
Even if the presumption of continuity was deemed applicable to Pacific atoll island States 
having lost their territory, it is debatable whether this would actually be the optimal solu-
tion as far as the interests of the states in question are concerned: it could put them in a po-
sition of political weakness vis-à-vis other states. Indeed, in addition to the Montevideo 
Convention criteria, statehood is understood to require some degree of recognition by other 
states in order to be established. The importance of recognition for statehood has long been 
subject to debate, some scholars (the “constitutive” school) arguing that it is a fundamental 
prerequisite and others (the “declaratory” school) minimising its effectiveness218. There 
appears today to be some degree of consensus over the fact that statehood does not entirely 
depend on recognition, but that it cannot exist in total absence of it either
219
. In regards to 
the presumption of state continuity, recognition by other states is important because it is the 
main support to statehood when the more objective Montevideo criteria cannot be fulfilled.  
 
It has been argued that continued recognition of a state can constitute a legal obligation in 
cases where a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law is the cause of the 
loss of a ground for statehood
220
. This obligation can be inferred from article 41(2) of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful acts: the article 
states that “no state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law], nor render aid or 
assistance in maintaining that situation”221. As per this article, states have an obligation not 
to recognize a loss of statehood caused by an internationally wrongful act and consequently 
to continue to recognize the affected country’s statehood: state practice concerning states 
illegally dispossessed of their territory through the unlawful use of force, such as Poland 
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and Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, confirms this interpretation
222
. As explained in subsec-
tion 3.1.1.2 however, it is uncertain whether the actions of states leading to climate change 
qualify as a breach of an international obligation. As such, the international community 
may in the current case not have a legal duty to recognise but rather only a moral obligation 
to do so
223
. This could lead to situations where other states have the possibility to only rec-
ognize deterritorialized states’ statehood when doing so would be politically or economi-
cally convenient for them.  
 
Even though in the current climate of global cooperation against climate change it would 
be difficult to imagine a state doing something as politically insensitive as calling a small 
state’s sovereignty into question, the absence of a clear norm forbidding it could have nega-
tive implications for the affected state and for the international legal order as a whole. In 
order to preserve stability in international law and state to state relations, further clarifica-
tion of to the status of states deterritorialized due to the effects of climate change will be 
required.  
 
4 Potential Solutions 
As was highlighted in the previous section, current international law rules and instruments 
are ill-equipped to address the novel challenges faced by Pacific island States confronted to 
sea level rise. This is not entirely surprising since most of these rules and instruments were 
elaborated long before climate change became a part of our reality: in many ways, they are 
based on the unwritten premise that the physical conditions on Earth are to be constant and 
predictable
224
. Reliance on this assumption, combined with the often static and rigid nature 
of legal norms, makes some legal rules less suitable for addressing important legal prob-
lems of today. Some resemblances and analogies can be traced between the issues at hand 
and existing frameworks, but the important change of situation brought upon by sea level 
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rise makes reconciling the two increasingly difficult. Further development of the law is 
thus needed. 
 
Different solutions have been put forward so far to fill the current normative gaps. More 
specifically, two distinct groups of proposals can be identified: first, those made in regards 
to the human issue of climate change migration, and second, those related to the more tech-
nical maritime territory and sovereignty issues. A review of each category of proposals is 
the subject of the first parts of this section. A suggestion of concrete measures which could 
bridge the gap between the two categories of issues and serve as complementary “incre-
mental” legal adaptation measures to a long-term solution follows in the second part of this 
section. 
 
4.1 Regulating Climate Migration 
In light of a review of the current situation, we can conclude that uncertainty surrounding 
the legal status of individuals migrating in response to climate change remains. Application 
of refugee law and other human rights norms to climate migrants proved unsuitable, and as 
such the development of a new framework has been called upon.  
 
Several scholars have suggested addressing the unresolved legal gaps by establishing a new 
instrument to protect climate migrants. The different proposals made with this aim in mind 
vary from one another in regards to the definition of the subject of the protection: some 
suggest officially defining the term “climate refugees” in order to clarify the meaning of 
the term and crystallize its existence in international law
225
, while others opt for an alter-
nate category such as “climate exiles”226, “climate change displaced persons”227 or “envi-
ronmentally displaced persons”228 to mark a departure from the Refugee Convention defini-
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tion and consequently make the definition better suited to the situation at hand. The pro-
posals also differ as to the structure of the suggested instrument. Some authors, stressing 
the importance and distinct character of climate change displacement, argue in favor of a 
stand-alone convention which they believe would be better suited to address the complexity 
of the problem
229
. One group of authors has gone one step further, drafting a model Con-
vention on the International Status of Environmentally Displaced Persons
230
. Others, on the 
contrary, are in favor of an instrument linked more directly to the climate regime, either as 
a fully integrated protocol to the FCCC
231
 or as an instrument basing its modalities on 
states’ Kyoto Protocol emission reduction quotas232.  
 
These proposals, varying in scope and form, can be likened to each other in the sense that 
they all draw on the 1951 Refugee Convention and approach the issue of climate migration 
from a human rights-based, protection framework perspective
233
. The proposals indeed all 
plan to regulate climate migration by first identifying a category of persons who would 
qualify for protection as a result of the negative effects of climate change on their living 
conditions, and then establishing a framework articulating the rights of these protected per-
sons. Two main obstacles to this approach’s feasibility must be pointed out.  
 
First, by requiring certain criteria to be fulfilled in order for the status to be granted, protec-
tion proposals risk reintroducing some of the technical and moral problems which rendered 
the 1951 Refugee Convention inapplicable to climate migrants. In the case of instruments 
that replicate the Refugee Convention’s process and determine eligibility on an individual 
basis
234
, a case-by-case assessment could prove very time and resource consuming, espe-
cially so considering the great number of people who may be expected to migrate. Some 
proposals attempt to “side step [this problem] by suggesting that entire communities or 
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populations groups be so designated”235. But even if these instruments manage to set up an 
effective process for the groups or areas concerned, the multicausality of climate change 
migration, as observed by McAdam, “could lead to considerable difficulty and inconsisten-
cy in decision making”236. Indeed, as the same author points out, “the degree to which cli-
mate change can – and needs to be – singled out as a factor would need careful considera-
tion”237. Establishing an instrument with the goal of providing protection on a broader scale 
than the Refugee Convention and the existing complementary protection mechanisms, only 
to have some people excluded from its application because the link between their need for 
relocation and climate change is judged insufficient, would not be of much use as it would 
only replicate existing uncertainties and inequalities.      
 
Second, the adoption of a new protection instrument appears unrealistic in light of the cur-
rent political context. This is especially true in regards to proposals for the enactment of a 
new convention. As some proponents of this approach themselves admit, “there may be 
reluctance to develop a new treaty given the existence of two seemingly relevant conven-
tions”238, the UNFCCC and the Refugee Convention. For States Parties to those conven-
tions, creation of a separate regime for climate change migration risks being seen as creat-
ing unnecessary and counterproductive overlaps
239
. In addition, negotiations towards a new 
multilateral treaty have a tendency to “bog down”240 and take a lot of time, effort and re-
sources to fulfill. This, combined with the climate of apprehension towards additional im-
migration currently prevailing in some potential host countries, casts further doubt over the 
willingness of governments to work towards what could be a costly and unpopular conven-
tion. Interestingly, both proposals for a new convention and those for a protection instru-
ment linked to the UNFCCC would also be likely to face opposition from some vulnerable 
states themselves, notably from Pacific island States. In Kiribati and in Tuvalu, for exam-
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ple, political circles and populations strongly reject the label of “climate change refugee”, 
which for them, as McAdam and Loughry note, “evokes a sense of helplessness and a lack 
of dignity that contradicts their very strong sense of pride”241.  
 
Underlining these obstacles to a new protection instrument for climate migration, another 
group of authors suggest an alternate approach, arguing in favor of framing climate move-
ment as an adaptation measure. The proposals made under this approach share the same 
general premise, preconizing a bottom-up approach through which states and regional or-
ganizations would be responsible for setting up the necessary migration agreements and 
programs. The specifics of the different suggestions however vary. Some authors preconize 
more centralized approaches relying directly on UNFCCC institutions
242
. Others recom-
mend approaches where the FCCC would play a more secondary role, either coordinat-
ing
243
 or providing subsidiary funding
244
 for the various regional or bilateral initiatives, 
which would be undertaken under less binding soft law instruments such as the Pacific Is-
lands Forum Niue Declaration on Climate Change
245
 and “build on existing geopolitical, 
economic, cultural and environmental relationships that already exist within many regional 
frameworks”246. 
 
The adaptation mechanism proposals constitute interesting alternatives to the adoption of a 
new protection instrument because, thanks to their less legally formal nature, they could 
avoid the associated functional obstacles. Indeed, admissibility, by being based on state-to-
state migration agreements rather than on predetermined and rigid criteria, would be more 
flexible and easier to keep in tune with the multicausal nature of climate movement and the 
various regional and local contexts. Framed as one facet of states’ climate adaptation strat-
egies, climate migration is also more likely to be pursued on the political level. States Par-
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ties to the UNFCCC have indeed already agreed to undertake “measures to enhance under-
standing, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displace-
ment, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and 
international levels”247 through the Cancun Agreements. Lastly, migration as adaptation 
would enhance migrants’ agency by allowing them to contribute to and thrive in their coun-
try of adoption: as such, the concept is more likely to be positively received by at-risk 
states and populations who, as one Kiribati official put it, “would like to relocate on merit 
and with dignity”248.  
 
4.2 Re-examining the Rules on Baselines and Statehood 
Although to a certain extent coastal geography has always been unstable, the advent of cli-
mate-induced sea level rise is likely to bring about territorial change of an unprecedented 
level. The possibility of this change, it has been shown in the previous section, raises ques-
tions regarding fundamental aspects of the law of the sea and, ultimately, of the law on 
statehood. A number of different solutions to these interrogations have been suggested in 
the literature. All of them are devised with the same ultimate objective in mind: to ensure 
the ongoing applicability and relevance of international law. Views on how to best fulfill 
this objective however differ greatly, and as such so do the suggested strategies. 
 
4.2.1 Baselines and Maritime Zones 
In regards to the rules on baselines and maritime zones, it has been said that in order to 
determine the way forward, the balancing of three competing concerns is necessary: the 
stability of maritime boundaries, the “land dominates the sea” principle and the need for 
international equity
249
. With this in mind, two schools of thought can be identified. A first 
group of authors is in favor of a freezing of baselines and maritime zones, which in their 
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opinion “would be consistent with, and would significantly assist in, the promotion and the 
achievement of the LOSC objectives of peace, stability, fairness and efficiency in ocean 
governance”250. Jesus, for example, suggests that baselines measured and published in ac-
cordance with UNCLOS provisions should be interpreted as permanent, irrespective of 
ensuing geographical changes
251
. Others opt for a more textual approach: Caron suggests 
developing a new rule, either through treaty or custom, which would freeze the boundaries 
of the various maritime zones
252
. In the same vein, Soons suggests the adoption of a rule 
freezing the outer limits of the territorial sea and the EEZ
253
. These two proposals differ in 
regards to their effect on the limit between the territorial sea and the internal waters of the 
coastal state: Caron’s iteration of the rule has been qualified by Hayashi as the better alter-
native, since a freezing of the innermost boundary would provide maximum stability by 
fixing the outer limit of states’ internal waters and maintaining the original breadth of the 
territorial sea and EEZ
254
.  
 
The idea of a new rule has subsequently been picked up and built upon by other authors, 
who have discussed the different forms it could take and the mechanisms through which it 
could be adopted. Grote Stoutenberg suggests that the new rule be established through a 
separate implementation agreement complementing the UNCLOS: that way, the political 
obstacles associated with an amendment to the Convention itself could be avoided
255
. 
Hayashi discusses the moment from which the baselines should be frozen, concluding that 
the freezing of a state’s should preferably coincide with the moment of publication of those 
baselines under article 16(2) UNCLOS since this would have the effect of giving states an 
added incentive for establishing their baselines
256
. He also submits a tentative example of 
what the provision could read like in practice
257
. 
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The idea of establishing a rule for fixed baselines has not however received unanimous 
support in academic circles. Lisztwan notes that such a rule would secure stability at the 
expense of the two other integral aspects of the law of the sea regime. Indeed, by weaken-
ing the requirement of a direct link between a state and its maritime territory, frozen base-
lines would go against the founding principle that land dominates the sea and could lead to 
increased conflict and poorer management in some maritime areas
258
. Such a rule would 
also, argues Lisztwan, undermine the principle of equity: as the rise in sea level progresses, 
coastal states would gain in overall maritime territory, and thus in marine resources, at the 
expense of the high seas territory allocated to the rest of the international community
259
. 
Palmer further points out that a freezing of the baselines would make the revision of past 
excessive claims made by states impossible
260
.  
 
4.2.2 Statehood 
The solutions put forward in relation to statehood issues are generally not as elaborate as 
the above-reviewed ones on baselines, since the absence of precedent has led most deliber-
ations on the subject to be made in the abstract
261
. Some of them start from the idea that it 
could be possible and wishful to “stretch” the legal presumption of state continuity so that 
it continues to apply despite a states’ permanent loss of territory or population. Suggestions 
such as their recognition as deterritorialized states
262
 or their likening to non-state sover-
eign entities like the Military Order of Malta
263
 are applications of this idea. Others are 
based on the premise that the legal concept of statehood is rigid and limited in scope and 
that as such, vulnerable states should take measures to ensure that they continue to fit in the 
established legal structure. Under this rationale, states at risk of being deterritorialized 
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could either secure additional territory, for example through a cession of land from another 
state
264
, or if that is not possible continue their existence in non-state form, for example 
through an agreement providing for self-governance in free association with another 
state
265
.  
 
Vidas, in his analysis of the issue, identifies two ways for the law to respond to a change of 
circumstance as important as the effects of climate-induced sea level rise on territory: 
through subordination of the facts to the law, or through adaptation of the law to the 
facts
266
. The proposals to freeze baselines and those attempting to secure deterritorialized 
states’ continued can be likened to the former approach: they indeed all attempt to solve a 
novel problem while remaining anchored to the law as it stands today. In Vidas’ view, “no 
forcing of presumptions, no invention of unsuitable analogies, and no artificial fixing of a 
‘permanent’ legal situation can produce the ultimate objectives of international law: stabil-
ity and peace” 267. A deeper reorganization of law and society may thus be necessary in the 
face of a profound change of circumstances: the extent of this reorganization will depend 
on the speed and the severity of the change
268
. The pace and extent of sea level rise is un-
predictable and as such, solutions need to be developed pre-emptively. Maas and Carius 
however warn that given the current state of affairs, “it appears unlikely that a global con-
sensus on how to deal with the impacts of climate change on sovereignty and territory will 
emerge”269. It is thus unclear whether the advent of appropriate and durable solutions to the 
territorial legal issues raised by the effects of sea level rise can be expected in the near fu-
ture. 
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4.3  “Incremental” Legal Adaptation Measures 
The previous review of suggested solutions to legal issues stemming from sea level rise 
leads to two overarching conclusions. The first is that in regards to both population and 
territory issues, a definite long-term solution has yet to be agreed upon. The second is that 
there is increasing consensus over the fact that in order to reach such a solution, a signifi-
cant development of international law will be necessary, if not through the reconceptualiza-
tion of some foundational aspects of the law themselves, then at least through the elabora-
tion of new instruments.  
 
A parallel can here be drawn between the important conceptual changes international law 
may have to go through and the physical changes necessary for humans, animals, plants 
and ecosystems to adapt to climate change. Indeed, in climate adaptation literature, re-
sponses to “vulnerabilities and risks […] so sizeable that they can be reduced only by novel 
or dramatically enlarged adaptations [or by] the reorganization of vulnerable systems” are 
defined as transformational adaptations
270
. By analogy, one could say that in the current 
context, the novel and fundamental challenges posed by sea level rise call for a “transfor-
mational adaptation” of some areas of international law. 
 
The counterpart to transformational adaptation is incremental adaptation: this type of adap-
tation consists in the extension or expansion of existing actions and behaviors that already 
reduce vulnerability or increase resilience to a phenomenon
271
. One adaptation researcher 
summarizes the difference between transformational adaptation and incremental adaptation 
as the following: “in incremental adaptation, there is change, but the basic characteristics of 
the system are maintained. Transformation means crossing a threshold: you were A and 
you become B.”272 Many incremental adaptation measures can also be said to double as 
“no-regrets” measures: as gradual expansions of already useful measures, they are likely to 
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yield benefits regardless of the extent of actual future change
273
. This is especially useful in 
the context of sea level rise, where considerable uncertainty remains as to the scale and rate 
of the rise. Transposed to international law, incremental adaptation could be said to consist 
in a scaling up of existing mechanisms in order to respond to a new situation. In the current 
context, it is possible to identify two legal mechanisms which could be relied upon as “in-
cremental legal measures” by Pacific island States for adaptation to sea level rise.  
 
One such measure would be the strengthening of existing migration channels in order to 
accommodate climate migration. Host country immigration policies could be revised, as 
well as bilateral and regional agreements expanded, so as to facilitate the movement of per-
sons from states affected by sea level rise. Increasing labor migration opportunities could 
be an especially practical option as it would be beneficial to both the migrant’s country of 
origin and host country. The latter would indeed fill a need in its workforce while the for-
mer would benefit from decreased demographic pressure on its territory as well as from an 
increased influx of resources through the transfer of remittance payments from migrant 
workers to their families and communities
274
. This approach could be realistically adopted 
between Pacific island States and their developed neighbors New-Zealand and Australia, 
this for three main reasons. First, the long-standing transnational ties between Pacific is-
landers and these countries remain strong today
275
, as shown by their high degree of col-
laboration through regional organizations like the Pacific Islands Forum
276
. Regional coop-
eration agreements set up through these organizations, such as the Niue Declaration on 
Climate Change, could hence serve as an institutional basis for increased migration framed 
as a “no-regrets” adaptation measure277.  
 
Second, there exists a political will to facilitate migration in both sender and receiver states: 
the fact that some policy measures with this goal in mind have already been undertaken in 
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both groups of states demonstrates this. For example, Kiribati has set up the “migration 
with dignity” policy, which aims “to improve language, workplace skills and qualifications, 
in order to make Kiribati citizens competitive and marketable at international labour mar-
kets”278, and New Zealand runs a seasonal worker scheme targeted specifically at Pacific 
island workers
279
. 
 
Third, a migration scheme which could either be relied on as-is and further developed, or 
serve as a model for additional bilateral or regional adaptive migration instruments, can 
already be found in New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category program280. This program of-
fers permanent residence to a certain number of citizens from Tuvalu, Kiribati and Tonga 
as well as their spouses and children each year, granted they have received a job offer and 
meet a minimum language and income requirement. This program has been very successful 
since its inception in 2002 and has been well-received among Pacific island populations
281
. 
The inauguration of similar schemes, or ideally of an integrated regional program, based on 
the Pacific Access Category model could thus be envisaged: complemented by measures 
designed to maximise the effectiveness of the scheme, such as reducing the transaction 
costs on remittances and ensuring proper integration of the migrants into the society of the 
host country
282
, these programs could constitute a useful incremental legal adaptation 
measure to climate-induced migration. 
 
Another incremental legal adaptation strategy consists in the securing of maritime entitle-
ments through unilateral or bilateral measures reaffirming the claim to these entitlements. 
Two such measures could here be of use. First, states whose rights over their maritime ter-
ritory are at risk should measure and officially publish their baselines in accordance with 
the relevant UNCLOS provisions
283
. This is especially true for states whose domestic legis-
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lation, like most Pacific island States’, can be interpreted as reiterating the ambulatory na-
ture of their baselines
284
. Measuring and publishing of baselines would be beneficial even 
for states without these domestic legislation issues however, and should thus be pursued by 
all vulnerable states. Indeed, doing so would reinforce the presumption of the existence of 
those baselines even in the face of geographical change. Purcell even argues that publishing 
baselines concretely guarantees their stability: according to her interpretation of the law on 
the matter, published baselines are conditional to geographic conditions at the time of their 
establishment, but not after that
285
. Even though this interpretation goes against the general 
consensus on the matter, it serves to show that there is no clear certitude over this issue and 
that as such, measures reinforcing presumed stability would be of practical use. 
 
Second, in cases where this is geographically possible, states willing to secure rights over 
their maritime zones should conclude maritime boundary agreements with their neighbor 
states. Doing so would, according to Lisztwan’s interpretation of treaty and case law on the 
matter, increase the stability of the agreed-upon boundaries since “maritime boundary 
agreements are resistant both to unilateral termination by a treaty party, and to challenges 
by third states, regardless of whether baselines are ambulatory or fixed”286. This measure is 
of great relevance to Pacific island States because of their geographical proximity to one 
another: it gives them the possibility to, if they are given access to the necessary technical 
expertise, sign agreements among them to protect them from potential third party challeng-
es. In the last years, Pacific island States have begun to avail themselves of this option. It 
has been noted that “from 2002 to 2010, there were a total of two maritime boundary 
agreements signed in the Pacific region. However, in the period 2011 to 2014, a total of 14 
maritime boundary agreements were formally endorsed”287. It can thus be said that incre-
mental legal adaptation measures for the securing of maritime territory rights are already 
being used by Pacific island States. 
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The two aforementioned examples show that incremental legal adaptation measures are 
advantageous in many regards when compared with the transformational measures re-
viewed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. First, by relying on existing legal frameworks and institu-
tions, they sidestep the conceptual and practical problems associated with the elaboration of 
new rules: they are likely to be operationalized faster and at a lower cost. The two measures 
explained above also have the advantage of not being anchored in only one area of interna-
tional law, having rather been devised with the complexity of adaptation in mind. As such, 
they aim to produce crosscutting positive effects for vulnerable states: for example, both 
policies increasing labor migration and measures to stabilize maritime boundaries have as a 
corollary goal to secure additional income to be used by the vulnerable state for further 
adaptation, the former through remittances and the latter through the strengthening of 
claims over maritime resources. Lastly, the two incremental legal measures contribute to 
the realisation of the at-risk populations’ human rights: by being pre-emptive and proactive 
in nature rather than reactive, they give affected populations more choices, allowing them 
to benefit from greater self-determination and to “adapt as they see fit”288. 
 
Incremental legal adaptation measures are not however without limitations. One notable 
challenge the above described measures face regards their stability and predictability. Alt-
hough they appear realistic in the current political context, the measures’ realization de-
pends on the ongoing collaboration of external actors, either through funding or the sharing 
of technical expertise. Since as it stands and as highlighted in section 3.1, collaboration 
remains largely discretionary to these outside actors, it is impossible to guarantee that the 
implementation of the measures would continue to be fulfilled in the future. Another, argu-
ably more fundamental, challenge for incremental legal adaptation is that it is not a final 
solution in itself: work migration from Pacific island States to neighboring countries will 
not allow the relocation of whole communities in scenarios of high sea level rise, just as 
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measures to strengthen the presumption of stability of their maritime boundaries will not 
give them a sure-fire guarantee that their territorial rights are secured. 
 
That is not to say that incremental legal adaptation measures are of no use. While they 
might not be the final solutions to the legal issues raised by sea level rise, they are likely to 
be useful as complementary “first-steps” to more profound reorganizations of international 
law. If understood and enacted with this goal in mind, they could have the added advantage 
of informing and orienting the necessary fundamental legal adaptation to follow. In this 
respect, the measures undertaken by Pacific island States could serve as examples for other 
vulnerable states and regions. 
 
5 Closing Thoughts 
The present thesis, through its analysis of the legal implications of adaptation to sea level 
rise for Pacific island States, attempted to draw a concise but complete overview of the 
diverse legal issues stemming from one effect of climate change and affecting one group of 
states, as well as of the solutions to these issues suggested by legal academia. The objective 
behind this focus was twofold: first, to highlight how the legal issues at hand, while draw-
ing on a number of different areas of international law, remain interrelated through their 
practical consequences for states and populations, and second, to underline the fact that 
many of the solutions put forward so far appear to have been developed without taking this 
interrelatedness into account and as such are limited in their effectiveness. 
 
The tentative incremental legal adaptation solutions suggested in the last subsection of the 
thesis avoid this disciplinary fragmentation to a certain extent and thus appear to be more 
concretely implementable. These solutions are however only temporary in scope. A durable 
and comprehensive legal solution to the issues of adaptation to sea level rise, and to climate 
change more generally, remains to be developed. An in-depth discussion of the potential 
form of this solution is outside the scope of this thesis. It is however possible to conclude 
 54 
by identifying one characteristic of the incremental solutions which could be transposed in 
a long term approach. 
 
The two incremental measures presented in the previous subsection preconize a less legally 
formal approach, instead relying on bilateral or regional cooperation and agreements. One 
main obstacle to their long-term viability, as was mentioned, is the uncertainty of continued 
support from developed states. A multilateral mechanism to supervise the long-term im-
plementation of local or regional adaptation schemes and coordinate their funding could 
thus be envisaged. Such a mechanism would have two advantages: because of the narrow 
scope of its functions, it could be simple in structure, and by being decentralized, it could 
operate more effectively in different states’ particular contexts. 
 
A coordinating mechanism would improve vulnerable populations’ capacity to adapt to 
climate change by ensuring that incremental adaptation measures remain steadily available. 
In other words, it would enable these measures, currently understood as viable only in the 
short-term, to be relied on in the medium- or long-term. By guaranteeing the availability of 
concrete responses to urgent adaptation needs, it could also allow the necessary transforma-
tional adaptation of the law to be effected progressively and thus more successfully. 
 
The 21
st
 UNFCCC COP will be held in November of 2015 in Paris, where a new global 
climate change agreement is to be adopted. According to Bodansky and Diringer, the 
agreement is expected to follow a hybrid model with both top-down and bottom-up policy 
elements
289
. Given the FCCC mandate to enhance action on adaptation through the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework
290
, a mechanism resembling the one hinted at above could be in-
cluded in the new agreement as a bottom-up measure. The outcome of the Paris Conference 
will likely be of great influence over the way adaptation is to be enacted in international 
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law: it will be interesting to see how the ideas put forth in this thesis hold up in regards to 
these upcoming developments.  
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